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REAL AND IMAGINED REFORM OF CAMPAIGN
CORRUPTION: A REVIEW OF DIRTY LITTLE
SECRETS. THE PERSISTENCE OF
CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS
Bradley A. Smitht
DmTY LimE SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN
POLITICS By Larry J. Sabato and Glenn R. Simpson, Times Books, 1996,
339 pages.
In 1987, University of Virginia political science professor Larry
Sabato wrote a short essay entitled, "Real and Imagined Corruption in
Campaign Financing."1 In it, Sabato argued that "the near-obsessive fo-
cus by public interest groups and the news media on the purported evils
of PACs [Political Action Committees] has diverted attention
from.., more fundamental matters."'2 While commentators had become
fixated on sources of campaign dollars, Sabato warned that more alarm-
ing campaign practices were increasing, including fraudulent fund-rais-
ing, unaccountable "independent" groups engaging in negative campaign
tactics, the abuse of tax-exempt foundations for political purposes, and
rapid growth in honoraria and other practices providing direct personal,
financial gain to legislators who pleased certain interested parties.3 As to
efforts to reform campaign finance by limiting contributions and spend-
ing, Sabato warned that past efforts had unfairly benefitted incumbents,
helped wealthy candidates, increased negative campaigns, and empow-
ered special interests, both intentionally and unintentionally. 4 Urging
caution in pressing reforms, he summarized his position as, "caveat
reformator: let the reformer beware."
5
A decade after Sabato wrote this provocative essay, public confi-
dence in governmental institutions continues to decline. Recent polls
show that fewer than twenty percent of Americans trust the federal gov-
t Associate Professor, Capital University Law School. B.A. Kalamazoo College, 1980;
J.D. Harvard Law School, 1990.
1 Larry Sabato, Real and Imagined Corruption in Campaign Financing, in ELECnONS
AMRIucAN STYLE 155-79 (A. James Reichley ed., 1987).
2 IL at 156.
3 Id. at 171-79.
4 Id. at 164-67.
5 Id. at 179.
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ernment to do what is right.6 Commentators have widely blamed this
distrust on America's system of campaign finance.7 Books and newspa-
per editorials are still bemoaning the "buying" of the President and
Congress. 8
Political pressure has also been building for major campaign finance
reform. Major campaign finance initiatives were passed by voters in five
states in 1996.9 In 1996, lobbyists made a concerted effort to pass fed-
eral campaign finance reform.10 Meanwhile, the academic community
has proposed elaborate regulatory schemes" and has organized lengthy
symposia to discuss the alleged problems of campaign finance.12
But is the campaign finance system really the problem, and if so, is
more regulation really the answer? A growing body of research suggests
that the premises upon which campaign finance reform efforts have been
built are at best unproven and at worst simply wrong. Campaign spend-
ing, as a percentage of gross domestic product, has remained steady for
many years.13 Total spending on all political activity amounts to just a
few dollars per year per eligible voter.14 Candidates on the extreme
ends of the American political spectrum have more success raising
money from small contributors than candidates who represent more pop-
6 Alan Murray, Forward to LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSoN, DIRTY LrrLE
SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS ix (1996). In 1964, 76
percent trusted the government to do what is right. Id. See also Kimberly Coursen et al.,
Restoring Faith in Congress, 11 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 249, 251-52 and citations therein
(1993) (citing polls showing low public opinion of Congress).
7 See Fred Wertheimer & Susan W. Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Re-
storing the Health of Our Democracy, 94 CoLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1126-1131 (1994) and cita-
tions therein.
8 See, e.g., CHARLES Lewis, THE BUYING OF THE PRESIDENT (1996); PHILIP M. STERN,
STILL THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN Buy (1992); BROOKS JACKSON, HONEST GRAFT: BIG
MONEY AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS (2d ed., Farragot Publishing Co. 1990)
(1988).
9 The five states are Montana, Arkansas, Colorado, California and Maine.
10 See, e.g., Jackie Howell, Common Cause Pushes for Action on Campaign Reform
Bills, COMMON CAUSE MAG., Summer 1996, at 36 (describing lobbying efforts by Common
Cause and other groups); Andrew Mollison, Senate Republicans' Vote Hands Campaign Fi-
nance Reform Bill a Defeat, ATLANTA CONST., June 26, 1996 (noting that over 260 newspa-
pers editorialized in favor of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform bill).
11 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public
Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1996); Edward B. Foley,
Equal Dollars Per Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L.
REv. 1204 (1994); Marry Jezer et al., A Proposal for Democratically Financed Elections, 11
YALE L. & POL'Y Rev. 333 (1993); Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform:
The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. Rev. 301 (1989).
12 See, e.g., 1995 U. Cn. LEGAL F. 111-192 (1995); 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 161-260
(1994); 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1125-1414 (1994); 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 381-500 (1992); 18 HoF-
STRA L. REv. 213-420 (1989).
13 Robert J. Samuelson, The Price of Politics, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 28, 1995, at 65.
14 Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign
Finance Reform, 105 YALE L. J. 1049, 1059 (1996).
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ular positions. 15 In predicting electoral outcomes, the critical financial
determinant is not which candidate spends the most, but whether a candi-
date spends enough to deliver his or her message to a critical mass of
voters. 16 Perhaps most importantly, campaign contributions have not
been shown to have a significant effect on legislative voting behavior, at
least when compared to party affiliation and agenda, personal ideology,
or perceived constituent interests and views.' 7 Given all this, the pur-
pose of campaign finance reform seems more suspect than ever before.' 8
At the same time, calls for more regulation often seem to be based
more on faith than any rationale analysis. After all, this decline in public
trust has come during a period of unprecedented campaign finance regu-
lation. Not only skeptics of campaign finance reform, but even support-
ers, are beginning to question whether regulation can solve the alleged
problems. 9
Now, Professor Sabato, who has the unique accomplishment of be-
ing both one of the most respected and most quotable scholars in the
field of political campaigns, 20 returns to tell us that reformers who focus
on campaign finance have indeed been pursuing both the wrong villains
and the wrong solutions. In Dirty Little Secrets: The Persistence of Cor-
ruption in American Politics, Sabato and his co-author, former Roll Call
and now Wall Street Journal reporter Glenn Simpson, show that media
and advocacy group focus on campaign finance reform has obscured, and
perhaps even contributed to, an alarming increase in many types of cor-
ruption thought to be long banished from the American political scene.
Such corruption includes vote fraud, buying and selling of votes and en-
dorsements, and gross abuses of government power. Left unchecked, the
15 Id. at 1062-64. This is largely because of the collective action problems prevalent in
campaign financing. Political campaigns are public goods, giving rational voters an incentive
to "free ride" on the donations of others. See Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 1995 U. Cia. LEGAL F. 111, 129-30 (1995). Those candidates most
likely to overcome these collective action problems are those whose electoral base consists of
highly ideological, non-pragmatic individuals. Smith, supra note 14, at 1064.
16 CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE AMmRIcAN ELEcroRATE, A STUDY OF CAMPAIGN Ex-
PENDITURES FOR WINNING CHALLENGERS IN U.S. SENATE AND HOUSE RACES: 1978-1994 12
(1996).
17 Smith, supra note 14, at 1068-70, and citations therein; for an alternative view, see
Lowenstein, supra note 11, at 313-22 (1989).
18 See David A. Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 141 (1995).
19 See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform,
18 HoFsTRA L. REv. 213 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Conse-
quences, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1390 (1994).
20 Sabato's many books include CAMPAIGNS AND ELEcriONS (1989); PAYING FOR ELEC-
TIONS (1989); AMEmCAN GovERNmENT (with Karen O'Connor) (1988); THE PARTY'S JUST
BEGUN (1988); PAC POWER (1984); and THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS (1981). A
quick Lexis search found 1145 newspaper references to Sabato from July 16, 1994 through
July 15, 1996.
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authors claim, such abuses will do far greater damage to American de-
mocracy than a few large, publicly disclosed campaign donations.
Dirty Little Secrets is divided into two major parts, which are in
many respects two separate books. The first half tells the story of the
Republican takeover of Congress in the 1994 elections. Here the book
takes a narrative form, starting with the entrenchment of the Democratic
majority in the United States House of Representatives during the 1970s
and the early political career of Newt Gingrich. This section progresses
with the story of how Gingrich created a conservative coalition which
used a variety of questionable tactics to break the hold of a long-term
Democratic congressional majority; a majority which, the authors stress,
was itself maintained through questionable practices.
This first section of the book seems certain to infuriate many con-
servatives, and many of the criticisms they will have are legitimate. The
authors casually link fringe militia groups and the mainstream term limits
movement as expressions of "[p]ublic disgust, anger, and alienation,"
with government.21 They suggest that the Christian Coalition's political
involvement violates its tax exemptionz2 without suggesting that the Na-
tional Education Association's political activities might do the same.
The authors describe President Clinton's 1993 budget as one "which
raised taxes on the wealthy," 23 which reads like a White House press
release for a budget that included a significant increase in gasoline taxes
on all Americans and increases in taxes on many social security recipi-
ents. Such comments, however, should not distract readers from the au-
thors' main point: Gingrich's GOPAC, the Christian Coalition and a
variety of other conservative groups engaged in tactics that may be legiti-
mately criticized as deceptive, and they evaded campaign finance laws
and other laws through dubious, if not illegal, practices.2
The Christian Coalition, the authors note, is organized as a
501(c)(4) organization under the federal tax code, meaning that contribu-
tions to the organization are not tax deductible but the organization itself
pays no federal income taxes. Such "social welfare" organizations may
engage in some political activity so long as such activity is not their
"primary" purpose. Because political involvement is supposed to be an
incidental activity, such groups are not required to comply with the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act (FECA), which limits the size and source of
contributions and requires disclosure of contributors. 25 The authors
make a convincing case that the Christian Coalition is primarily a parti-
21 SABATO & SIMPsoN, supra note 6, at 20-21.
22 Id. at 114.
23 Id. at 136.
24 Id. Chs. 3 and 4.
25 Id. at 310-11.
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san political organization. As such, its activities violate its tax-exempt
status.2 Similarly, the authors present considerable evidence accusing
conservative groups, such as Americans for Term Limits, the National
Rifle Association, and Newt Gingrich's GOPAC organization, of abusing
a variety of loopholes in federal law to hide both the source and amount
of their political spending and to evade contribution limits set by law.27
They conclude that "the GOP's long-sought victory was abetted by what
were, at best, unorthodox new campaign techniques, and at worst, unethi-
cal and illegal practices. '2
But while this section of the book is mainly concerned with ques-
tionable tactics used by Republicans to capture Congress in 1994, a care-
ful reading leaves liberals with no room to wag "I told you so" fingers.
The authors take pains to point out, for example, that Democrats were
guilty of "the original sin"29 - that of driving competition out of con-
gressional elections through gerrymandered political districts, abuse of
the congressional frank,30 the expansion and unlawful use of congres-
sional staffs for campaign purposes, the manipulation of the subcommit-
tee system to extort money from interest groups, and the rigging of
campaign finance reform measures to benefit pro-Democratic groups
such as labor unions, trial lawyers and Hollywood liberals.31 Further-
more, they argue that "Democrats... pioneered the tactics adopted so
successfully by the Christian Coalition-the use of nominally nonparti-
san mass membership organizations to run covert partisan campaigns. '32
They also chide the press and academia for their longstanding failure to
expose or even question what the authors call an "illegitimate" Demo-
cratic majority in the House of Representatives. They suggest that this
failure is in part because the idea of an illegitimate Democratic majority
"remains an unpopular one in both academia and journalism. '33 Repub-
lican partisans might be excused for wondering why it took a GOP vic-
tory to bring this type of scrutiny to the electoral system: Democratic
26 Id. at 109-17, 125-41. However, it should be noted that the IRS has never ruled on the
Coalition's tax status. Id. at 311.
27 Shortly after the publication of DiRT LrrrLE SEcanrs, GOPAC won a significant
court victory affirming its compliance with federal election laws. Federal Election Comm'n v.
GOPAC, 917 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1996).
28 SABATO & SIwSON, supra note 6, at 27.
29 i at 149.
30 The "frank" is Congress' right to taxpayer-financed mailings. Though the frank is
intended to inform constituents, in fact most mailings are thinly veiled campaign pieces. The
amount of franking increases dramatically in election years. Id. at 222-27.
31 Id. at 49-57.
32 Id. at 149.
33 Id. at 101 n.49. The authors also write that in the view of a "complacent" press, "the
end of the Democrats' forty-year hegemony was never meant to be." Id. at 26.
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partisans should be embarrassed at their party's creation and long-term
exploitation of the type of tactics the Republicans have finally mastered.
This first section makes for interesting reading for those seeking to
learn about the magnitude of the Republicans' 1994 victory and how the
Republicans accomplished it. It also contributes to an understanding of
the increased partisanship which has arisen in Congress since the mid-
1980s. In the end, however, its 150 pages can be distilled into a simple
message: Newt Gingrich was right about the illegitimacy of the Demo-
cratic majority in the U.S. House of Representatives. His insight and
skill broke that majority. Unfortunately, Republicans in general and
Newt in particular have "started down the path to becoming that which
they so insightfully decried." 34 The authors see Republicans already be-
ginning to manipulate the perks of office to extort campaign contribu-
tions and to remain in office by using unfair campaign advantages in the
same manner as the Democrats before them. Corruption, they stress, is a
bipartisan affair.
In the second half of Dirty Little Secrets, Sabato and Simpson aban-
don the narrative style of Part I in favor of a descriptive, laundry list
approach to five areas of increasing corruption which have been largely
ignored by the media and academia. These include a rise in political
"dirty tricks"; the new technique of "push polling"; vote fraud; "street
money"; and abuse of government power by incumbent lawmakers.
Although the two halves of the book are rarely linked directly, they
are complimentary. The abuses described in Part I relate to efforts by
each party to create systemic and institutional advantages for its candi-
dates. One of those abuses may have the parties dodging and weaving to
evade tax and campaign finance laws. However, the tactics discussed are
not things that, save for those laws, would generally be viewed as mor-
ally reprehensible. That is to say, while the tactics and strategies outlined
in the first part of the book may be troubling, one suspects that political
partisans and cynics will be able to explain them away.
For example, did the Democrats squeeze out competition through
gerrymandering? Well, gerrymandering is an old tradition, and redis-
tricting is inherently partisan. Was the Congressional frank expanded
and abused? Perhaps, but Congress has a legitimate need to communi-
cate with constituents, and it is hard to police the line where that legiti-
mate use becomes unfair, taxpayer-subsidized campaigning. Certainly
the Democrats expanded Congressional staff for constituency service
matters and used these services as a steady source of favors for which
payback could be collected at the polls. Then again, it was the public
that demanded that its congressional representatives become ombudsmen
34 Id. at 150.
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as well as legislators. Additionally, while one can make a good case that
GOPAC and the Christian Coalition abused their legal status to engage in
federal campaign activity, the IRS has not challenged the Christian Coa-
lition's status or activities for six years, and most of GOPAC's actions
were recently approved by a federal court.3 5 Such tactics may not appear
in a civics textbook, but then we all know that "politics ain't beanbag."
However, even the most cynical observer would be hard pressed to
justify any of the tactics and strategies described in Part II of Dirty Little
Secrets. In five chapters that should be greatly disturbing to anyone con-
cerned about American democracy, the authors explore in detail resur-
gent corruption in American politics. Unlike the ardent proponents of
campaign finance reform who have controlled the good government de-
bate for the last quarter century, when Sabato and Simpson discuss cor-
ruption, they are not talking about individuals giving money to
candidates who share their views. These authors are concerned with real,
old-fashioned corruption such as stolen elections, rigged voting ma-
chines, and the vilest slander. Whereas a growing number of scholars are
expressing skepticism of campaign finance reform and even whether the
alleged problems of campaign finance can truly be called "corruption" at
all,36 no one would publicly defend the tactics described in these pages.
There is not much need to detail here the evidence and many exam-
ples presented by the authors, but a quick skim through each chapter
should give the reader of this review a flavor for what is going on in
American politics. In Chapter 6, entitled "Dirty Tricks," we learn of
"opposition researchers" blackmailing opposing candidates with embar-
rassing personal and family information. They obtain such information
easily through America's vast computer databases or by secretly employ-
ing private detectives. We learn of illegal eavesdropping on cellular calls
and unlawful raiding of credit files and medical records to obtain embar-
rassing information on candidates. We discover increasingly sleazy cam-
paign tactics meant not to advance a candidate's campaign but merely to
disrupt a political opponent. For instance, someone called a Chicago ho-
tel and canceled a scheduled fundraiser for Republican candidate
Michael Flanagan by falsely informing the hotel that Flanagan's mother
had died.37
35 Federal Elections Comm'n v. GOPAC, 917 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1996).
36 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 14, at 1067-71; Cain, supra note 15, at 134-37; Strauss,
supra note 18, at 142-149; Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Argu-
ments, Intractable Dilemmas 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1258, 1269-76 (1994); FRANK SORAUIF,
MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 316 (1992); Gottlieb, supra note 19 at 273-76.
37 SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 6, at 185. The story turned out well for Flanagan,
though. Because of the confusion, the hotel reduced Flanagan's bill for the event by $4000, so
that his net gain from the fundraiser was greater than if the caller had not attempted to disrupt
the event. Id.
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In Chapter 7, Sabato and Simpson explore the dirty world of "street
money," monetary payments used to secure voter turnout. Republicans
had developed the use of street money in the last century, but it is a tactic
now used mainly by Democrats, especially in minority communities. "In-
creasingly," write the authors, "money has become a key to securing the
party's minority base." 38
The use of street money is often legitimate, as when parties make
small cash payments to "flushers" who go through neighborhoods re-
minding the party's registered members to vote, and "drivers," who drive
vans of these voters to the polls. In recent years, however, the use of
street money has gotten of control. The authors cite instances of black
ministers demanding "honorariums" of up to $5000 in return for endorse-
ments. They also tell of ministers, politicians and community leaders
who, in return for campaign help, require the party to funnel thousands of
dollars in "contracts" to firms owned by friends or relatives. These firms
may or may not actually do any work.39
Street money can also take the form of bribes to voters. For exam-
ple, in the Alaska governor's race in 1994, won by Democrat Tony
Knowles by just 583 votes, party leaders in one overwhelmingly Demo-
cratic borough set up a "Gas for Votes" program to guarantee a high
borough turnout.40 Legally, the amount of gas given to voters could not
exceed the actual amount needed by them to travel to polls, and the gas
had to be targeted to the Native Alaskan population. In fact, however,
campaign workers gave voters vouchers good for 10 gallons of gas to
any borough voter who asked, regardless of the voter's race or the dis-
tance traveled to vote.4 ' Although street money payments and bribes
have primarily been a Democratic Party tactic, the Republicans hardly
come away with unstained hands: the authors also report on underhanded
tactics and use of street money by Republicans intended to suppress mi-
nority turnout.42
Chapter 8 focuses on the abuse of government power by incumbent
officeholders, especially through their improper use of the congressional
frank and the use of their paid congressional staff for political purposes.
Though the latter practice is clearly illegal, Sabato and Simpson show
how numerous loopholes in the law, such as one allowing congressional
staffers to campaign in their "free time, '43 are used to provide incumbent
congressmen with government paid campaign staff. Similarly, in the
38 Id. at 188.
39 Id. at 194-201.
40 The program provides free gas in order to help voters get to the polls.
41 SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 6, at 201-02.
42 Id. at 202-05.
43 Id. at 213.
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name of improving "constituency service," members of Congress have
developed, at government expense, vast databases containing informa-
tion about their constituents. This information can then be used at cam-
paign time.44
Chapter 9 explores the noxious, yet booming tactic of "push-pol-
ling" by which candidates and campaigns spread false rumors about their
opponents through phony "polls" asking hypothetical questions. For ex-
ample, in the 1994 U.S. Senate race in Minnesota, some voters were
asked as part of a "poll": "Would it make a difference it you knew that
[Democratic candidate] Ann Wynia was a lesbian?" 45 Leaving aside any
question of the morality of gay baiting as a campaign strategy, Wynia
was not a lesbian. The intent of the question was clearly to leave voters
with a false impression. Another poll, this one conducted for Virginia
Democrats, asked voters if they would still support Republican State
House of Delegates candidate Terry Kilgore if they knew that he had
"taken" $4000 from a client. In fact, Kilgore, a lawyer, had received the
payment in return for legitimate legal services rendered.46
Other forms of telephone sleaze are also described. For example, in
one incident that eventually did draw press attention (but only long after
the election), Florida Democratic Gubernatorial candidate Lawton Chiles
paid for phone bank calls that falsely accused Republican nominee Jeb
Bush of having cheated on his taxes and his running mate as being in
favor of abolishing Social Security. In addition to these falsehoods, re-
cipients of these calls were told that the calls were being made on behalf
of various non-existent "senior" and "Republican" groups.47
Finally, in Chapter 10, Sabato and Simpson document a rise in
traditional, old-fashioned vote fraud. Examples they cite include, but are
not limited to, campaign workers intimidating and lying to elderly and
immigrant voters to obtain their signatures on absentee ballots. These
campaign workers would then often complete the ballots themselves. 48
Other campaign workers obtained absentee ballots and "assisted" coma-
tose patients in filling them out.49 The authors also described gross ir-
regularities in the handling and counting of ballots50 and the rigging of
election machines.5 '
44 IdL at 229-36.
45 Id. at 265.
46 Id. at 266.
47 Id. at 257-58. See also Michael Griffin, Senate Passes Misleading-Call Bill, ORLANDO
SNTwrIm., Apr. 20, 1996, at D3.
48 SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 6, at 280-82.
49 Id. at 285.
50 Id. at 285-87.
51 Id. at 285-86.
1996]
150 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6:141
As Sabato and Simpson pass through this parade of modem cam-
paign horrors, at every stage they criticize the press for failing to investi-
gate and expose these unsavory and often illegal tactics. The main
reason for this failure, the authors suggest, is simply cynicism. However,
in some cases, such as the press' reluctance to investigate the use and
misuse of "street money" to turn out minority voters, they blame media
bias and a climate of "political correctness in the newsrooms of
America."52
Surely another reason for the failure to discover, disclose and dis-
cuss the resurgence of political corruption is the same problem identified
by Sabato a decade ago: the fixation of the press, academia, and the pub-
lic on the size and sources of publicly disclosed campaign contributions.
As Sabato and Simpson stress repeatedly, the ultimate solution to the
problems they document must be vigilance by the press and public cou-
pled with punishment at the polls for those who engage in such acts.
Yet, instead of looking for vote fraud, slanderous push-polls, street
money bribery, and the unlawful use of government staff for campaign
purposes, news agencies are devoting their resources, time, and space to
the chimera of campaign finance reform. Does Phil Gramm get mone-
tary support from the National Rifle Association's PAC? That is corrup-
tion, howls the press, even though Gramm's views on gun control are
consistent with those of his Texas constituency and hardly unknown to
even the most casually informed voter. With the press focused on such
non-corruption, the public remains largely unaware of the serious cam-
paign abuses documented by Sabato and Simpson. Emboldened by their
success and the lack of public outcry, the purveyors of such sleazy or
illegal tactics feel free to go still further in the next campaign.
In fact, not only the fixation on campaign finance, but the campaign
finance laws themselves may be contributing to many of the problems
discussed by Sabato and Simpson. For example, the Federal Elections
Campaign Act boosted incumbent fund raising advantages and helped to
eliminate electoral competition, entrenching the Democratic congres-
sional majority.53 It was in response to this entrenchment that the con-
servatives gradually founded GOPAC, the Christian Coalition and other
groups that could claim exemption from federal campaign contribution
laws and thus equalize the money side of campaigning. By squeezing
money out of the political system, FECA has also had the perverse effect
of making candidates more dependent than ever on special interests that
can provide either dollars or manpower.54 The Federal Elections Com-
52 Id. at 188.
53 Id. at 328. See also Smith, supra note 14, at 1072-75.
54 SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 6, at 333. It has also locked special interests into a
strategy of attempting to affect legislation, rather than electing sympathizers. Smith, supra
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mission (FEC), its resources unequal to the task of monitoring contribu-
tions, policing "independent" expenditures and "direct advocacy, '55 and
enforcing its arcane, 264 page code of regulations, has become largely
ineffective. Its ineffectiveness has, in turn, eroded respect for all laws
governing elections. 56
In response, campaign finance reform advocates argue that more
laws are needed, and more power ought to be given to the FEC to en-
force those laws. Sabato and Simpson suggest, however, that it makes
no sense to complicate the law still further:
The last two decades have produced greater regulation of
politics than occurred in all of the proceeding two centu-
ries, and yet many critics contend that the problems are
worse now than they have ever been. Is the logical step
really more regulation? 57
Furthermore, they note that a stronger FEC runs afoul of a core Ameri-
can value, that of unfettered political participation. They also question
whether a benign "political police" can exist.5 8
Instead of more regulation, Sabato and Simpson propose what they
call "deregulation plus." They would deregulate much of the campaign
finance system, sharply increasing the limits on personal contributions
and abolishing limits on political party contributions. At the same time,
they would increase disclosure requirements, using federal securities reg-
ulation as a model.5 9 Groups such as organized labor, GOPAC and the
Christian Coalition would be required to fully disclose all of their polit-
ical activities, and campaigns would have to disclose more information
on individual donors, particularly the donor's place of employment and
profession. This would allow "a well-informed marketplace... [to] be
the judge of whether someone has accepted too much money from a par-
ticular interest group or spent too much to win an election... If the facts
are as awful as reformers contend ... then the public will be moved to
demand change."'60 Penalties for failure to disclose would be racheted
upward. Full disclosure would push the involvement of the Christian
note 14, at 1075-76. Such "legislative" strategies are generally viewed with greater concern
than "electoral" strategies. Cf. Lowenstein, supra note 11, at 308-13.
55 "Independent" expenditures, that is to say, those not coordinated with a candidate's
campaign, are exempt from regulation under FECA, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976),
as are expenditures by political parties which do not directly advocate the defeat or election of
a candidate. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
56 SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 6, at 326.
57 ld. at 327.
58 ld. at 326-27 (quoting Jan Baran, counsel for the Colorado Republican Federal Cam-
paign Commission in Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309
(1996)).
59 Ld. at 330-35.
60 id. at 330.
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Coalition, U.S. Term Limits, labor unions, trial lawyers and the busi-
nesses funding GOPAC out of the shadows and into the open. Voters, in
turn, could use the information to place candidates on the political spec-
trum and to identify the likely legislative interests of candidates. Such
"sunlight" should also reduce any appearance of corruption caused by
large contributions. 61
Sabato and Simpson leave many details of such a plan unexplored.
For instance, would they allow direct corporate and union contributions,
which are banned under current law? Doing so would be consistent with
their idea of bringing sources of financial support into the open. Corpora-
tions and unions are now allowed to contribute "soft money" directly to
political parties. If Congress removes the limits on party contributions to
candidates, corporations and unions may give indirectly to candidates
through the parties. 62 It may be better just to allow direct contribu-
tions. 63 Unfortunately, the authors do not discuss the issue. While they
argue for raising the personal contribution ceiling from $1000 to $5000
and indexing it for inflation, it is hard to see, using the logic of "deregu-
lation plus," why any limit should remain. Indeed, though Sabato and
Simpson skim over such questions, perhaps complete deregulation is
their real goal: "The regulation of sources of funds and sizes of contribu-
tions," they write, "could be greatly loosened or even abandoned alto-
gether."64 Wisely, the authors would exempt relatively small political
spenders, both groups and individuals, from the increased disclosure re-
quirements, thereby assuring that a federal regulatory web does not en-
tangle grassroots political activity.65
Disclosure does not address the concerns of those who favor cam-
paign finance reform as a means to silence some speakers in an effort to
enforce their notions of political equality. 66 Sabato and Simpson do not
61 Id. at 331-32, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976).
62 The right of parties to spend freely in support of their own candidates was recently
upheld by the Supreme Court in Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S.
Ct. 2309 (1996).
63 On the other hand, there are benefits to requiring contributions to move through polit-
ical parties. See Lowenstein, supra note 11, at 351-55, 361. There are also some reasons for
continuing to ban direct contributions by corporations (and labor unions). See Austin v. Michi-
gan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). However, the force of Sabato and
Simpson's argument would seem to favor unrestricted contributions, precisely to avoid games-
manship and efforts to find loopholes in the law.
64 SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 6, at 330 (emphasis added).
65 They suggest a reporting threshold of $25,000 to $50,000 per election cycle. Id. at
332. This may, in fact, be constitutionally required. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995). For a quick overview of some of the problems attendant to disclosure
laws, see Bradley A. Smith, Congress Shall Make No Law .... WASH. TrrMES, Dec. 29, 1994,
at A19.
66 See e.g. Hasen, supra note 11; Foley, supra note 11; Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz,
The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elec-
tions, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 1160 (1994). For critiques of these conceptions of "equality," see
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address this alleged problem. Their goal is to expose and eradicate real
corruption within the American political system, not to create a new
political regime. Theirs is a practical tome. Although they hint at a lack
of enthusiasm for such leveling efforts, 67 they seem to consider the point
moot by stating that: "Practically speaking, it may be unrealistic to think
that political participants-and the courts-will ever abide the draconian
new restrictions on political activity contemplated by some reformers. '68
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has forcefully rejected the
equality rationale as a sufficient governmental interest to justify the bur-
den campaign finance regulation places on the First Amendment. 69
Beyond campaign finance, disclosure is also the preferred remedy
for a variety of illnesses discussed in the book. For example, many cam-
paigns hide their dirty tricks, negative phone campaigns, push-polls, and
street money payments behind lump sum payments made to law firms or
innocuously named consulting firms. These entities then make the actual
payments to the vendors and persons involved in such tactics. A person
reviewing the reports would have no idea that the $60,000 payment made
to the "ABC Group" or a law firm might be for street money or push-
polling.
Sabato and Simpson would require candidates to include on their
disclosure reports any subcontractors to whom contractors make cam-
paign-related payments. They would also require candidates to make
payments by check, thereby creating a traceable record.70 Pollsters and
phone banks would have to disclose the campaign or organization paying
them to poll and provide a copy of the poll questions on request.71 In
addition, the authors would require congressmen and senators to disclose
all contacts with regulatory agencies, making it easier for the press and
watchdog groups to spot inappropriate interference and conduct.72
Sabato and Simpson suggest several other incremental reforms, such as
BeVier, supra note 36; Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to
Liberty, in THE Biu OF RIGHTS AND T=E MODERN STATE 225 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds.,
1992).
67 SABATO & SIMPsoN, supra note 6, at 327 ("it is perhaps too idealistic and naive to
suppose that the FEC can be 'the first benign political police in the history of man-
kind' ... The United States has thrived on unfettered political activity; it is a core national
value") (citation omitted); id. at 329 ("the right to organize and attempt to influence politics is
a fundamental constitutional guarantee ... that need[s] to be forcefully protected. To place
draconian limits on political speech is simply a bad idea.").
68 Id. at 327.
69 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) ("Mhe concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment...").
70 SABATO & SiMPsoN, supra note 6, at 313, 315.
71 ld. at 319-20.
72 Id. at 335-36.
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tax credits for small contributions, but the active ingredient in their pre-
scription is sunlight.
Yet sunlight, the authors are acutely aware, requires more than mere
laws requiring disclosure. It requires a press willing to take the informa-
tion disclosed to the public and willing to dig deeply in its efforts to root
out illicit vote fraud and other tactics that would not appear on disclosure
forms. It further requires a public willing to act on such information.
Campaign finance reform efforts, by distracting the press and public
from more serious issues, have hindered, rather than helped, efforts to
root out corruption and restore confidence in American democracy.
The disclosure approach requires voters to penalize those who com-
pete unfairly or engage in illegal or sleazy tactics and to reward those
who attempt to clean up the system. Unfortunately, Sabato and Simpson
seem reluctant to give much credit to the efforts made by Republicans to
clean up the system. Though the authors argue that the congressional
franking privilege has been long abused and needs to be reformed, they
give Republicans no credit for cutting franking budgets and limiting
mailings during the ninety days before an election. Instead, they attack
the Republicans for "refus[ing] to do away with or even seriously cur-
tail" the frank.73
Similarly, having argued against the growth and misuse of congres-
sional staff, the authors nevertheless dismiss Republican cuts in congres-
sional committee staffs for "leaving unscathed large personal staffs." 74
Yet, another trick used by Democrats to control the House of Representa-
tives from the mid-1960s until 1994 was the expansion of subcommit-
tees, allowing more than half of the House's Democrats to claim the title
"chair." From these fiefdoms, the Democrats extracted political contri-
butions from affected interests and acquired additional staff resources
that proved helpful to their reelection campaigns. 75 Although the authors
favor reductions in the number of subcommittees, 76 the Republicans are
not even mentioned in connection with the book's passing reference to
"the House" making a major reduction in subcommittees in early 1995.77
While it is true that the Republican efforts in each area leave much to be
desired, the authors might have viewed them as positive first steps. Why
should any party in power take steps that might harm its future electoral
chances when doing so engenders so little praise and so much scorn from
the same people arguing for such reforms?
73 Id. at 317.
74 Id. at 317-18.
75 Id. at 49-50, 57.
76 Id. at 313.
77 Id.
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The book suffers from other defects which bear mentioning. The
authors bill it as an "unusual undertaking," one of a handful of collabora-
tions between a journalist and political scientist.78 The academic reader
may not find this a plus. The book often falls into a muckraking style.
In one passage, the authors tell us that campaigns are "sinking ever
deeper into a bog of sleaze and slime-a primordial political ooze whose
toxicity is increased by new technologies that make voters who are al-
ready turned off hate politics all the more intensely. '79 This hardly
seems necessary as Sabato has long been an eminently readable scholar.
Many of the attacks on the Christian Coalition needlessly smack of ad
hominem ridicule. For example, they tell us that Coalition Executive
Director Ralph Reed "had undergone a religious conversion in a Capitol
Hill bar."8' 0 In a typical passage, Reed does not exhort his members but
rather makes "promises to his disciples." 8'
While the authors disclose many truly alarming cases of true corrup-
tion, they sometimes cheapen the work by sensationalizing the mundane.
For example, they discuss a $2.5 million contribution from privately held
Amway Corporation to the Republican National Committee to help es-
tablish a party television studio. They then tell us that after the Republi-
cans assumed control of congress in 1995, Amway began "cashing in" by
helping to persuade Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole to support amend-
ments to the telephone deregulation bill that benefitted the company.
Only in a footnote do they reveal that Amway officials merely co-signed
a letter with telecommunications managers at thirty-six other corpora-
tions, urging the senator to support an amendment to the bill allowing all
would-be competitors to enter the market simultaneously.8 2 Further, it is
no secret that Amway's founder and primary shareholder, Richard
DeVos, is a long-time conservative activist, political contributor and out-
spoken supporter of deregulation.83 This type of selective reporting of
facts only serves to damage the credibility of the book. Credibility is
78 Id. at xiii.
79 ld. at 3. Whether such tabloid prose was needed to reach a mass audience is doubtful:
Sabato is normally one of the most readable political scientists around.
80 Id. at 110.
81 Id at 112.
82 Id. at 121-22 and n.7
83 See, e.g., Daniel Morgan, Selling Free Enterprise: Amway Battles Liberal Ideology in
Politics, WASH. PosT, Mar. 14, 1981, at Al (noting that Amway headquarters features a prom-
inent sign reading "Center for Free Enterprise" and that DeVos and Amway have made finan-
cial contributions to the Education Voucher Institute, the Heritage Foundation, Hillsdale
College, religious broadcasting stations and other conservative groups, and they have spon-
sored workshops to train high school teachers in free market economics); Sandra G. Boodman,
Views of Four AIDS Panelists Hit, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1987, at Al (discussing DeVos'
involvement in the 1980 Reagan campaign; past support of the National Conservative Political
Action Committee and the Christian Freedom Foundation; and his appointment by President
Reagan to the President's Commission on AIDS).
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important for a work that must frequently rely on confidential sources for
its tales of corruption.
Despite such flaws, this book deserves to be read. The first two
sections, with their details of corruption, are shocking and at times de-
pressing. The story they tell is vital to those who care about improving
American democracy. As depressing as these first two sections of the
book are, the concluding section of proposed reforms is ultimately opti-
mistic and refreshing. The authors generally avoid the "correlation
equals causation" reasoning that is so typical of popular writing on cam-
paign finance reform, thus allowing them to engage in some serious anal-
ysis. They do not present the reader with elaborate schemes and
convoluted justifications for evading the First Amendment and regulating
political life in an effort to stamp out the alleged, but unproven "corrup-
tion" of political campaign contributions, or to promote some chimeric
view of equality. Sabato and Simpson may not have all the answers, but
at least they begin to address the real problems. Their proposed solutions
are sensible, realistic and appropriately modest. They do not propose a
new law for every problem.
What our democracy needs more than new campaign laws is an in-
formed, vigilant public. This book is a needed first step to inform that
public of the resurgent corruption in politics. It is also an important re-
minder to the press and academia of our duty to share in that process of
education.
